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 
Abstract— Transaction Cost Economics is a recent perspective 
to organizations analysis, and it is still little applied in the public 
sector. The purpose of this paper is to assess the relative 
efficiency of two primary health care platforms, one in Argentina 
and the another one in Brazil. The transaction costs are 
categorized, counted and normalized into quartiles from direct 
observation, interviews and documental review. Besides, 
institutional arrangements are described. The discriminating 
hypothesis of association between organizational efficiency and 
the alignment of transaction characteristics with the governance 
mode is comparatively tested. The analysis showed that the 
Brazilian case presented lower frequency of transaction costs 
because its institutional arrangement contains more coordination 
and incentives with less strategic uncertainty. The evaluation 
method developed in this paper highlights the importance of 
studying the characteristics of organization for the generation of 
knowledge and production of managerial contributions over 
public health service’s delivery. 
 
Index Terms—Governance, Transaction Costs, Primary 
Health Care Services, Efficiency  
I. INTRODUCTION 
HE purpose of this paper is to verify comparatively the 
alignment effects between the characteristics of the 
institutional arrangement, or governance structure, and 
characteristics of primary health care (PHC) services 
according to the concept of market transaction and also on the 
efficiency of these services in two areas, i.e., the municipality 
of Oberá, Argentina, and Palmeira da Missões in Brazil. Given 
the difficulty of measuring transaction costs [1], the study 
herein presented was limited to qualitative comparison of the 
characteristics of the governance structure and the primary 
health care transaction that prevails in these two territories 
with the characteristics and potential relationships between 
them that are unveiled by the theory of Transaction Cost 
Economics (TCE). 
The impetus for this study proceeded from the fact that the 
availability of funding for public health systems in most 
economically developed nations neither guarantees the 
fairness nor solves the full access to health services. Such 
verification indicates that the solution to this problem is not 
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limited to the financial aspect, and the organizational issue 
explains in part the inefficiency of the health systems. On the 
other hand, the orientation of health services for primary care 
is a common place and the main goal of care in the poorest 
regions of the world. For these regions, the literature 
recommends institutional changes in order to induce 
performance of health promotion and prevention alongside 
traditional services that search for cure, which occur when the 
diseases have been already manifested.   
Institutional changes in the PHC model with the goal of 
reducing inequality of access, guided by the concept of health 
promotion and services provided in a decentralized manner 
were designed and implemented in different Latin American 
countries from the end of the 1980s, as evidenced by Mesa-
Lago [2]. In Brazil, in obedience to the provisions of the 
Federal Constitution of 1988, the Unified Health System 
(SUS) established this type of programs and turned the states 
and especially municipalities into the main institutional actors 
in the provision of such services. In the Argentinian case, the 
central government began to design health policies towards 
PHC since 2005, i.e. it assigned that role for the provinces, but 
in this country, the sub-national governments partially agreed 
with the proposed reforms leading to a lower effectiveness in 
comparison to Brazil. In addition, the comparative analysis 
between Brazil and Argentina has extra motivation as it will 
add knowledge of the implications of a possible competition 
of the inhabitants from the jurisdictional boundary for this 
type of services. The further integration in Mercosur to 
involve more immigration and more integrated provision of 
public services it should be taken into account that it is more 
difficult to form or anticipate governance arrangements 
between the two countries if the operating principles of the 
internal actors are radically different [3].   
The paper is divided into six sections. The next section 
explores the analytical framework of TCE. The third section 
describes the testing method of the relationship between 
transaction characteristics and governance structure of the 
PHC used in the research. The three subsequent sections 
present and analyze the characteristics of the transaction and 
governance of PHC in the compared regions.   
II. TRANSACTION COST ECONOMICS 
A. Transaction concept 
From the TCE perspective, a transaction is the analytical 
unit that contains the principles of conflict, mutuality and 
order; thereafter, governance would be the means of infusing 
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order, mitigating conflicts and allowing mutual gains from 
voluntary exchange [4]. In the case of PHC services, the 
transaction requires the establishment of standards to avoid 
conflicts otherwise it would derail the service delivery. 
B. Transaction characteristics 
Some definitions are required to standardize the 
understanding of the efficiency analysis. For example, 
transactions are defined based on the exchange structure. This 
exchange is based on two analytically bilateral acts, i.e. the act 
of mutual consent, where the participation constraint of the 
agency model is satisfied and the material of exchanging 
itself, when the incentive compatibility constraint is also 
satisfied [5]. Thus, the contracts may be discrete when mutual 
consent is expressed in the act of exchange or relational when 
mutual consent is expressed separately from the subsequent 
acts of exchange [6]. In the first case, the mutual consent 
generates a transaction immediately and induces a mode of 
governance based on the direct purchase of goods or services 
in the market. In the second case, technological solutions 
appear, such as hierarchical relational structures for internal 
production of goods and services. Between these two 
extremes, hybrid governance arrangements can be developed. 
The PHC does not face an efficient market with a spontaneous 
offer of services because it is an essential service of universal 
provision. Thus, it demands understanding the elements that 
according to the TCE theory compose the transaction then to 
explain their adequacy with an existing technological platform 
or mode of governance and its related transaction costs 
generated. 
Overall, the transaction has three dimensions or 
characteristics: the specificity of the asset traded (financial, 
physical, human, intangible, etc.), the risk it is exposed (that 
potentially causes disturbance) and the frequency of 
occurrence [1]. 
The specificity of the PHC services cannot be neglected. In 
addition, PHC services would be more difficult to measure 
than the services of waste collection, for instance, due to the 
lack of waste collection is perceived from one day to another, 
while the lack of primary health care services cannot be felt 
immediately. This lack of measurability is identified as a 
factor inducing the opportunism, which increases the risk (ex-
ante) of disturbances [1] or expropriation (ex-post) inducing 
contractors to an adaptation depending on the contractual 
incompleteness and on the degree of bilateral dependence. The 
frequency of the characteristics of a transaction indicates a 
way to reduce costs and provides a signal about the 
organization's reputation legitimizing it [8]. Thus, the 
transaction cost for governance structures is a frequency 
function that depends on the specificities, risks of externalities 
and moral hazards. 
C. PHC transaction 
It is stated repeatedly that the regions with the primary 
health care (PHC) achieve better results, for example, in 
mortality rates in general, mortality due to heart disease and 
infant mortality, as well as detecting many types of cancer on 
earlier stage [9]. There are PHC initiatives in Argentina and 
Brazil, which for our purposes constitutes the adoption of 
aligned practices (transactions) and structures (governance) 
aimed at reducing transaction costs ex-post in the area of 
public health as a whole. 
 
To characterize the PHC transaction it is useful to compare 
it with the model of traditional health provision. The 
conventional medical care (in contrast to the primary care 
approach) is not continuous and has a secondary instance (a 
doctor's appointment, for example) as the gateway in the 
system of health services. It is neither preventive nor promoter 
and, usually there is no prior knowledge between the health 
professional (doctor) and patient. Accordingly, Table I shows 
the regularities of the promotion model consisting of a multi-
organizational strategy of comprehensive and continuous 
health care processes, provided by a multidisciplinary team, as 
well as with community participation in education and 
prevention activities. Thus, the idealized PHC model provides 
a reasonable degree of specificity and the government presents 
itself as the only political and economic organization able to 
establish, coordinate, maintain and expand its supply. 
 
D. Transaction costs 
Transaction costs represent an alternative response about 
the share of contribution of the institutional arrangement on 
the efficiency of organizations. For example, how the failure 
of working hours under scenarios of short supply of skilled 
labor interferes with the health services efficiency? 
Transaction costs are those involved in conducting an 
exchange with economic value, or simply the costs of 
participating in the market. These costs, however, are difficult 
to express in monetary terms [10]. Transaction costs can also 
be categorized into direct, i.e. those preventive to disturbances 
in the transaction (ex-ante) or friction, those arising from 
disturbances itself (ex-post). Transaction costs are generally 
identified in the organization as a whole in stages or parts of 
the productive process and people involved [11]. The 
transaction costs of each case will be described in section VI. 
TABLE I 
MEDICAL CARE AND PHC CARE 
 Traditional Medical Care PHC Care 
Focus Disease Health 







 Care by episodes Continuous care 







 Doctors Groups of other professionals 




Only the health sector 
 
Inter-sectoral collaboration 
 Professional domain Participatory community 
 Passive reception Auto-responsibility 
   
Based on Starfield [18] 
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E. Discrete and expanded governance structures 
To the extent that market failures are recognized a ranking 
or a mode of governance between the transacting parties 
becomes necessary assuming interdependence between them 
and determining the decision to produce internally or to 
purchase the goods or services transacted. This is therefore, a 
technological platform chosen that unfolds into three parts: (1) 
instruments, (2) performance attributes and (3) type of 
contract. 
The instruments are subdivided into two. The first one is the 
incentives to alignment, which are mobilized in pursuit of 
appropriate governance mode for a given transaction. These 
incentives describe the degree that a contractual party 
appropriates the gains (or losses) relating to its efforts and 
decisions [12]. In this sense, the idea of incentives, originating 
from the agency theory, equals the public sector to the firm 
[13]. The second type of instrument is represented by 
administrative controls, which are defined as instruments of 
monitoring and accountability [12]. On the other hand, the 
performance attribute depends on the adaptation of the parties 
to the contract, whether it is autonomous or coordinated. An 
autonomous adaptation occurs in markets with a large number 
of sellers and buyers, which is not the case of PHC. In 
imperfect markets, there are safeguards coordinating 
preventive contractual risks (moral hazards and externalities). 
Finally, the contract itself is typified by Williamson [10] in: 
‘classic’, where the price mechanism adjusts the relationships 
between contractors, so the incentive instruments and controls 
are unnecessary; ‘neoclassical’ where the incentive 
instruments and control are necessary to combat potential 
failures of the transaction, and ‘relational’, where there is 
bilateral dependence, forcing the internalization of production 
through an own set of rules and regulations with a particular 
and specific pattern [14].   
From the characteristics listed, discrete governance 
structures are located at two extreme and opposite poles, on 
the one side the market (or privatization) and on the other one 
the firm (or hierarchy). However, the entire continuum 
between these two poles characterizes the hybrid governance 
mode.  
In the public sector, new institutional arrangements 
alternative to a purely hierarchical or vertical structure were 
prescribed since the late 1970s. It led to the involvement of 
more actors in sharing the responsibility for a service 
provision. Networks of unique but interdependent social actors 
have been the target of coordinated policy actions (ex-ante), in 
order to reduce ex-post transaction costs that tend to 
materialize in persistent problems. This change opens the 
possibility for the public service to be provided, at least in 
part, by cooperation among different jurisdictions, which 
characterizes intergovernmental alignment or even with the 
help of the private sector representing then a network. 
According to Goldsmith and Eggers [15], governing by 
network represents the synthesis of some trends: high level of 
public-private collaboration that is characteristic of a 
government that subcontracts or assigns the supply of 
services; robust capabilities for managing an aligned 
government (in this case, the Union / Nation, states / provinces 
and municipalities) and technological readiness to group the 
network. In the case of federations, the network necessarily 
depends on the construction of a prior intergovernmental 
alignment also called co-governance or co-management.  On 
the one hand, the network governance is based on exchange 
relationships, based on trust, solidarity, reciprocity and 
consensus, in order to forge the collective action [19],[20]. 
Moreover, the expanded governance being either 
intergovernmental alignment or network demand coordination, 
which is a characteristic attribute of the hierarchy. Thus, these 
hybrid forms represent an attempt to combine the 
characteristics of full privatization (market) with a public 
agency (hierarchy / relational), where a government oversees 
the provision of public goods and services by another public 
or private agent in the beneficiary population. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This is a qualitative and quantitative study of exploratory 
analysis performed on data extracted from two case studies on 
the PHC provided in Oberá (Argentina) and Palmeira das 
Missões (Brazil), which seeks to test the hypothesis of 
discriminant association of efficiency with institutional 
alignment between the basic characteristics and governance 
structure of the PHC transaction, following the methodology 
of comparative analysis. The test of the discriminant 
alignment hypothesis according to the TCE theory guided the 
data survey that was performed from governmental databases, 
interviews and from direct observation between the years 2009 
and 2010. Figure 1 illustrates the proposed comparative study:     
 
Fig. 1.  Research design 
 
Under a reduced form, the research variables interact 
according to: 
 
Institutional efficiency = f [governance structure; transaction characteristics]   (1) 
 
The independent variable is a construct of two components, 
namely the PHC transaction and its governance structure. 
Given the attributes of its components, this dichotomous 
qualitative variable can assume values ‘alignment’ or 
‘misalignment’.  
The description of a PHC ideal transaction and its risks of 
failure and disturbances originated from the book on primary 
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SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES BETWEEN HEALTH CARE PLATFORMS 
 Argentina Brazil 
Access Fragmented. Theoretically 
universal from the public 
sector. Some private 
prepaid medical care plans 
and the employees’ ‘Obras 
Sociais’. 
Fragmented. Theoretically 
universal from the public sector. 
The Unified System (SUS) is 
nationally organized and 
operated in co-management by 
the federal government, states 
and municipalities. The private 
sector serves upon direct 





Primary, secondary and 




Primary, secondary and tertiary 
care. Ascending pyramidal 





Less regulated. Each 
province organizes its own 
public system. Companies 
of prepaid medical care 
plans and the ‘Obras 
Sociais’ are articulated with 
the Public Sector buying 
and selling services to each 
other. 
 
Regulated in the Constitution, 
laws and ordinances and 
covenants issued by the Ministry 
of Health A public sector 
organization is more 
homogeneous at the local level. 
Emphasis on co-management of 




The Public Sector is 
financed by provincial and 
national contributions. The 
earmarking depends on the 
Province. ‘Obras Sociais’ 
are financed by 
contributions from their 
members 
 
Federal, state and municipal 
earmarked contributions. The 
private sector health plans 
organize their funding with 
oversight of a regulatory agency. 
   
 
health care of Starfield [18], whose issues raised were 
interpreted and classified as identifiers of transaction costs 
regarding to organizational, procedural and personnel 
management aspects. In turn, the observed frequencies of risks 
(direct costs) or disturbances (friction costs) available for this 
ideal model were counted and distinguished as arising from 
specificities, environmental externalities and moral hazards 
and distributed into quartiles. The governance structure for its 
part is influenced by the institutional environment, which 
should be described as determinant (legal framework, 
structure of state and government, among others). Instruments 
such as alignment incentives (control, monitoring, 
accountability and bureaucracy), performance attributes 
(adaptation mechanisms) and type of contract (relational, 
neoclassical and classical) serve to describe and characterize 
the governance structure (left side of Figure 1). 
According to Stake [19], the dependent variables should 
preferably be defined experimentally than operationally. 
However, the TCE theory defines these variables so as 
conceptual. In the context of this study, the dependent 
variables are the performance and efficiency of PHC in Oberá 
and Palmeira das Missões. The PHC efficiency is usually 
presented by the evolution of indirect indicators such as infant 
mortality, maternal mortality, hospitalization for sequelae of 
stroke, limb amputation due to complications of diabetes 
mellitus, and vaccination coverage [20].  The alignment is 
then verified by the correspondence (or not) between the 
categories of governance structure (market, organizational 
hierarchy and hybrid) and the categories of transaction 
(discrete, relational or hybrid contract) for at least two 
characteristics analysis, and it is confirmed vis-à-vis the 
dependent variable performance. For example, the transaction 
may have a degree of specificity for certain resources resulting 
in greater bilateral dependence. Thus, if there are few 
pediatricians in the context analyzed this situation indicates 
high specificity and requires, according to the TCE theory, a 
structure with characteristics of hierarchy. Therefore, if the 
specificity is similar in both contexts, and if a feature of 
analysis is less aligned with the hierarchy relative to the other, 
it is expected that its performance is worse. 
IV. HEALTH SYSTEM PLATFORMS 
The primary care is part of the health system and constitutes 
a universal right recognized in Misiones, Argentina, by its 
Provincial Constitution and in Brazil by its Constitution. 
However, in practice, the provision of services is fragmented. 
The public sector, in both countries, is addressed to the poor. 
In 1940, the ‘Obras Sociais’ were instituted in Argentina, 
which are medical and care plans run by professional 
categories unions [21]. In Brazil, workers can rely either on 
private plans paid partly by the employer, or they depend on 
the Unified Health System [22]. Health care in Argentina was 
traditionally drawn from hospitals, regardless of the degree of 
complexity of care. However, since 1996, a slow shift of care 
towards units of lesser complexity and under the jurisdiction 
of provincial or municipal tiers of government has been 
introduced. In Brazil, health is a municipal service according 
to the Federal Constitution in 1988. Slowly, there was a 
pyramidal construction of the care model from lowest to 
highest complexity, from smaller and simpler referral centers 
to regional health centers. However, one of the problems in 
the organizational Brazilian model is the lack of counter-
referencing, which does not provide comprehensive care to 
patients. In Argentina, each province organizes its health 
services with a high degree of autonomy. The National Health 
Ministry created a national forum in 1981 for the coordination 
of provincial ministries of health, the ‘Consejo Federal de 
Salud’ (COFESA), but until 2011, provincial policies were 
heterogeneous. Brazil, in turn, established, throughout the 
history of the Unified Health System, a series of mediating 
instances of dialogue (CONASS, CONASEMS, CMS, CIT, 
CIB, etc.) which ensure greater coordination. Still in Brazil, 
regulation is more uniform due to the Unified Health System 
laws and ordinances of the Health Ministry reach all tiers of 
government. 
 
An important distinction in the Brazilian case refers to the 
strategy of the federal and / or state government of using 
incentives to achieve agreement of all agents in the system. 
The height of the pact occurred in 2006, when municipalities 
and states agreed to performance targets with the Union, 
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allowing it to assume definitely the general coordination and 
implementation of the decentralized health services. Table II 
summarizes the main differences between the platforms of 
perceived health in both countries. 
V. COMPARED PRIMARY HEALTH CARE PLATFORMS  
The federative health situation appears different in the two 
cases. Oberá features more autonomy in policy formulation on 
the PHC because the municipality is not responsible for 
health. This role is played by provinces.  
 
On the other hand, the provincial health jurisdictions are 
subdivided into areas equivalent to the municipalities. In 
Brazil, the ‘sale’ of municipal autonomy in formulating health 
strategies is offset by the possibility of influence in the arenas 
of the political pact. 
 
Table III shows a set of distinctions between the two 
countries: i) greater challenge to change the gateway of the 
system for the Argentinian case, mainly due to historical 
development, its federal arrangement and the lack of human 
resources. This context favors the possibility that PHC 
coordination being the target of political disputes, what is bad 
for the needed articulation to a service with a considerable 
degree of specificity; ii) moral hazard in Brazil in the 
operationalization of incentives as encouragement given in 
terms of population coverage without description of 
measurement units of services; iii) Palmeira das Missões has a 
complex platform, with more alignment among government 
actors compared to Oberá. It generates evidence of lower risk 
of externality resulting from strategic bad adaptation (ex-post 
costs) in the Brazilian context, in contrast to the Argentinian 
one.   
VI. CONSTRUCT AND RESULTS ANALYSIS 
The alignment between the independent variables 
determines the PHC efficiency. The PHC transaction is 
assumed as a form of care with minimum and universal 
components to be observed. Therefore, what remains is to 
describe and position the governance structures of PHC and its 
transaction costs to come to some conclusion on the adequacy 
of the technological contexts analyzed. 
A. Governance attributes 
Governance structures of Oberá and Palmeira das Missões 
were categorized and framed from direct observation on the 
spot interviews and secondary data analysis. The following 
summarized information culminated in attributes conferred on 
each platform according to Table IV. 
The organization of primary care services in Oberá is 
prevalent in the public sector, on a platform aimed at hierarchy 
TABLE III 
COMPARED HEALTH CARE GOVERNANCE STRUCTURES 
Institutional 
arrangements Oberá Palmeira das Missões 
























   
Budgetary 
earmarking 
Province rules Federal rules for the 
three tiers of 
government 
   




In transition from the Hospital 
to PHC units and from 
traditional PHC units to 
National Family Health 
Program 
 
In transition from 
traditional health 





In the same jurisdiction 
 

















Fragmented into programs 
 





Occasional in programs 
 
Monthly updated 




Provincial for some programs 
National to others 
 
Federal 
   
 
TABLE IV 






das Missões Oberá 
Agency/ 
Hierarchy 
Instruments     














    
Adaptative autonomy 
(no safeguards) 
++ + + 0 
     
Adaptative integrity 
(safeguards) 
0 + + ++ 
 
Contractual ‘law’ 
    
Labor relations  
 
   
Executive 
autonomy 






















     
Source: Based on Williamson [4]. ++ = strong; += semi strong; 0=weak 
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and it is the result of the influence of the central government 
over the provinces and municipalities and of the province over 
the municipality. The adherence to the National Family Health 
Program (PSF) in the Province of Misiones (where Oberá is 
located) in 2009 represented an initial effort of 
intergovernmental alignment towards unified PHC policy.  
 
The province joined the national PSF and partially 
introduced this differentiated PHC model in five out of 
thirteen peripheral units of structures that provide primary care 
services in the municipality. In return, it received some 
financial incentives. The strongest incentive instrument of 
governance structure in Oberá is the deployment of medicines 
by the central government to the local units of PHC through 
the program called ‘Remediar’. However, this program has 
been constructed according to the concept of disease, and this 
incentive is not perceived as valid by the researchers for 
conducting a proper PHC transaction.  The apparent absence 
of safeguards guaranteeing an explicit roll of services for the 
PHC indicates no integrity in contractual relationships 
organized by the province because the provincial health 
system does not provide coverage targets and topical 
productivity in health. The exception is in the safeguards 
imposed in a program called ‘Plan Nacer’, such as the 
suspension of financial incentives subject to non-compliance 
with its rules. Work teams of PHC, based on provincial units 
are not quantitatively and qualitatively defined, as prescribed 
by the model promoted by the national government (PSF). 
Such additional evidence gives an idea of the magnitude of the 
uncertainty that is present in the institutional structure of 
governance in Oberá. Finally, the PHC human resources are 
hired either by as employees or by outsourcing contracts. This 
combination of features makes the PHC governance mode of 
Oberá be situated in an intermediate position, i.e. in a more 
pronounced tendency to the hierarchy pole, or more reticent to 
an intergovernmental hybrid mode than the Palmeira das 
Missões structure. 
 
In Palmeira das Missões, the PHC structure is in the initial 
phase of transformation from the traditional model of primary 
health care units to the model advocated by the National 
Family Health Strategy. The adherence to the new strategy is 
two out of fifteen existing units. This shift began in 2006 
encouraged by a funding floor for the PHC. Besides, a former 
traditional unit is being remodeled to house two more family 
health teams in downtown and other traditional unit will be 
converted into Family Health Unit, bringing the total of units 
aligned to the new strategy to five out of fifteen. The Federal 
Government got the compliance of Palmeira das Missões with 
agreed health targets through the Statement of Management 
Commitment with the State and Municipalities Inter-managers 
Commission (CIB). The municipality could formulate its own 
policy of PHC through the Municipal Health Plan, provided 
that it was aligned with state and national guidelines. 
However, such a plan has not been completed. Despite this, 
there is the possibility of taking advantage of incentives 
offered by the federal government since the municipality is 
increasingly aligned with the national PHC policy, because 
both the increase in coverage and the implementation of 
differentiated tasks increases the PHC amount funding floor. 
Hence the classification of the incentives was ranked as ‘high 
impacts’. The municipal bureaucracy as adaptive integrity is 
considered intermediate or semi-strong, due to two 
antagonistic reasons: first because, internally, the municipality 
cannot avoid the administrative burdens and in its exogenous 
environment, there are safeguards imposed by the Statement 
of Management Commitment, which forces it to feed 
epidemiological information systems, for example. Second, 
the lack of internal controls, operational audits and other 
instruments of accountability join the under use of some pro-
competitive practices of management, such as procurement by 
electronic auction. It added to this strategic uncertainty the 
quantitative and qualitative definition of work teams in 
relation to population coverage without the determination of 
who should do what, with which resources and how often.  To 
illustrate, the frequency of home visits and practice of clinical 
procedures among units of analysis demonstrate differences. 
Finally, although the health services are municipalized, from 
the standpoint of labor relations, there are employees who are 
civil servants and employees outsourced. 
The governance structure of the PHC in Palmeira das 
Missões can be interpreted by its composition, with more 
conviction than that of Oberá as a model in transition from the 
hierarchy mode to a hybrid one of central regulation. 
B. Transaction costs 
The main direct transaction costs observed in Oberá and 
Palmeira das Missões are related to the specificities: health 
budget earmarking in the province (Argentina) and in the 
municipality (Brazil) and the universality of these services in 
both contexts. Direct costs observed simply in Oberá are the 
existence of a regional health care law, the obligation of the 
province government in the PHC provision, the high diffusion 
or institutionalization of a model; state production of 
medicines, provincial bureaucratization, territorial 
categorization of executing units as differential complexity, 
and the reduction in size of the health promotion territory in 
rural areas. The existence of a local administrative structure, in 
turn, is a direct cost observed only in Palmeira das Missões.   
The friction costs related to the specificities identified in 
Palmeira das Missões are the low per-capita health budget, 
lack of medicines and deficit in management practices, 
involving the procurement of inadequate inputs. With regard 
to Oberá, it appears the nasty investment in equipment due to 
the high number of users who depend on public services and 
the lack of clinical analysis, as well as the low wages. The 
scarcity of health workers is a cost friction that appears in both 
cases. 
There are direct costs common to both cases in the 
environmental dimension, like the existence of a national 
guideline for policy and implementation and the 
decentralization of services towards municipalities. In 
Palmeira das Missões the federal guidelines' policy and the 
registry of patients in the health care units are followed. The 
comprehensive distribution of medicines in the PHC units is 
GSTF Journal on Business Review (GBR) Vol.2 No.2, October 2012
©The Author(s) 2012. This article is published with open access by the GSTF
82
 
seen only in Oberá. The environmental friction costs observed 
both in Palmeira das Missões and in Oberá were the no 
integrated clinical records, the slow process of transformation 
to a PHC health promoting and the heterogeneous PHC 
policies within health jurisdictions. The emphasis on curative 
medicine and the lack of information on non-communicable 
and chronic diseases are friction costs exclusive of Oberá. 
Finally, the moral hazards direct costs identified in Oberá 
were the presences of PHC guidelines focusing on maternal 
and child health, the ‘Plan Mamá’ program with quantitative 
targets, the ‘Plan Nacer’ program also with quantitative 
targets, and the existence of PHC units working off-business 
hours on call. The existence of a defined time care in units is a 
direct cost common to both cases. However, the existence of 
specific information systems for primary care is a direct cost 
only of Palmeira das Missões. The moral hazard friction cost 
observed exclusively in Palmeira das Missões was the lack of 
a Local Health Plan. The non-compliance with working hours 
and the existence of heterogeneous work teams are friction 
costs common to both cases. Finally, the emphasis on maternal 
and child health at the expense of other fields of care, the 
centrality of the providing care in the unit (instead of home 
care) and the operational and political misalignment (among 
tiers of government) are friction costs of Oberá. 
 
Fig. 2.  Compared frequencies of direct (D) and friction (F) transaction 
costs observed in Palmeira das Missões (PM) and in Oberá (Ob). The figure is 
based on the Genugten’s work [12]. 
 
The field survey arrives at the situation depicted in Figure 2, 
whose the larger triangle area is the transaction costs of Oberá, 
while the smaller one represents Palmeira das Missões. In both 
contexts analyzed, some factors contribute to the existence of 
specificity, as the essentiality of the services, the distance from 
referral centers for work, the education, the levels of poverty, 
the low volume of resources available for health financing and 
particularly for the PHC. If the degree of PHC specificity is 
not null, the analysis turns to the other properties, i.e. the risks 
of environmental externalities and moral hazards. If it is not 
prevented the risks of environmental externalities become 
costs of bad adaptation because bad adaptation arises from 
insufficient investments in communication, negotiation, design 
and safeguards primarily coordinated by those responsible for 
the PHC management. 
 
The data collected indicated that more safeguards emerged 
in Oberá coping externalities risk than in Palmeira das 
Missões. Thus, one would expect a lower frequency of bad 
adaptation transaction costs in the Argentinian case when 
compared to the Brazilian one, but Palmeira das Missões 
showed lower frequency of externalities friction costs even 
with fewer direct costs invested. The explanation lies in the 
uncertainty about the best way to solve problems related to 
services’ provision or about which tier of government should 
formulate health policies and leads those involved to a poorer 
adaptation behavior in the Argentinian case. 
The central government ‘buys’ more successfully the 
autonomy from local governments in Brazil through the 
formulation and communication of primary care services. It is 
established thereby, a structure of co-governance; strategic 
and institutional uncertainties are faced with lower frequency 
of direct costs, instituting and ensuring intergovernmental 
alignment. Any saving effort is relevant in scenarios of proven 
specificity of resources. The mode of co-governance is a 
hybrid structure nearest the hierarchical / bureaucratic pole 
than the market one. The tier that ‘sells’ its autonomy relieves 
its platform of governance from adaptive integrity or owns 
greater coordination and seeks a type of adaptive autonomy, 
which means aligning itself with an exogenous policy. The 
‘buyer’ entity, usually in a higher tier gives incentives to the 
platform of governance of the ‘seller’ entity in a lower tier and 
coordinates itself the PHC system. Thus, the Brazilian 
governance mode seeks to establish a possibility of sharing 
decisions by ‘buying’ autonomy from local governments by 
the central government more firmly. Nevertheless, the 
safeguards are not as well established to prevent disturbances 
that occur due to moral hazard, such as avoidance of the local 
planning tasks and operational control of the services. That’s 
the case of lack of a Municipal Health Plan. 
In the Argentinian case, the central government takes also 
efforts in order to ‘buy’ sub national autonomy for the 
formulation and communication of PHC policies. However, 
these efforts of implementation of a regulatory and hybrid 
platform contain inconsistencies in their orientation. The 
scope of national regulation of the provincial PHC is limited 
to the maternal and child health care. Due to the strategic and 
institutional uncertainties verified, externalities and their risks 
are greater for Argentina than for Brazil. 
Moral hazard, in turn, results from the difficulty of 
measuring services. The lack of actual knowledge on the part 
performed of the tasks contracted is an opportunity for 
expropriation by the contracted. Direct costs would then be 
due to the stipulation of quantitative and qualitative standards 
of service, while the friction would result in bad performance 
of the contracted. The Argentinian case revealed direct costs 
of preventing the moral hazards slightly more frequent than 
the Brazilian one. 
Evidence suggests, in short, lower incidence of transaction 
costs in Palmeira das Missões than in Oberá because its 
institutional arrangement has greater coordination and 
incentives with less strategic uncertainty. 
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